Fighting From the Ultimate High Ground by Polyard, Timothy et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Selected Student Publications
2021-09
Fighting From the Ultimate High Ground
Polyard, Timothy; Fountain, Adam; Foltermann, Andrew;
Latrell, Edwin
U.S. Naval Institute
Polyard, Timothy; Fountain, Adam; Foltermann, Andrew & Latrell, Edwin. "Fighting
From the Ultimate High Ground"  Marine Corps Gazette (US Naval Institute). Vol.
105 No. 5, September 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67956
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
82 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • September 2021
IDEAS & ISSUES (SPACE OPERATIONS)
The purpose of this article is to address our dependence on space-enabled capabili-ties and to outline a way for-
ward for Navy and Marine Corps space 
planning and integration. Our national 
and military leaderships recognize that 
maintaining the advantage in the space 
domain is vital to our success in any 
future conflict; however, we continue 
to struggle to develop, resource, and 
integrate the capabilities necessary to 
maintain dominance in this domain. 
The target audiences for this article 
are key decision makers throughout 
the Navy and Marine Corps and the 
warfighters who provide tactical and 
operational space support to our mari-
time Services.
Our Dependence on Space
 The days of sextants, spy glasses, and 
semaphore are far behind us. To main-
tain our position as the world’s premier 
fighting force, we have developed the 
science and technology necessary to 
collect far more accurate intelligence, 
make our kill chains far shorter and 
faster, our weapons far more precise, 
and our command and control (C2) far 
more efficient. Because of this drive for 
speed and precision, we have become 
completely dependent on space capabili-
ties in several key areas:
 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Re-
connaissance (ISR). The boundary that 
separates our atmosphere from space 
is an ongoing physics debate; however, 
for the sake of international treaties, 
this boundary (also known as the Kar-
man Line) is generally accepted to be 
one hundred kilometers above sea level. 
Above this altitude, national boundaries 
cease to exist, and rules governing the 
movement of satellites tend to mirror 
those we see in international waters—
where all ships, regardless of the flags 
they sail under, are free to move about 
wherever they please on the global 
commons. This freedom to traverse 
any country’s territory above one hun-
dred kilometers has made space-based 
ISR the primary source of intelligence 
collection for ourselves as well as our 
adversaries. It is important for our com-
manders to understand that, even when 
we are conducting training in our own 
backyards, we are under observation.
 Positioning, Navigation, and Timing. 
The precise and accurate  positioning, 
navigation, and timing services pro-
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“More than any other 
nation, the United States 
relies on space-based 
capabilities to project 
and employ power on 
a global scale. Today, 
U.S. reliance on space 
has increased to the 
point where space ca-
pabilities not only en-
hance, but enable our 
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vided by the global positioning system 
(GPS) enables a vast array of our most 
actionable warfighting capabilities. It 
enables the ability to navigate quickly 
from one place to another and to track 
and coordinate our forces’ movement 
in realtime. It provides the guidance 
data necessary for our precision-guided 
munitions  as well as the precise timing 
required to operate our communications 
systems.
 Satellite Communications (SAT-
COM). SATCOM has become our go-
to medium for beyond line of sight com-
munications and information transfer. 
It is far more efficient and can provide 
a lower probability of detection when 
compared to other traditional forms of 
long-range over-the-horizon commu-
nications. SATCOM also provides the 
conduit for the common operational 
picture, which offers our commanders 
near realtime battlespace awareness.
 Missile Warning. Missile warning is 
provided by overhead persistent infrared 
(OPIR) satellites that can detect objects 
emitting high thermal signatures, in-
cluding missile launches. This capability 
provides our forces the advance notice 
necessary to cue immediate defensive 
actions. OPIR satellites also feed the 
targeting process and can assist in battle 
damage assessment and assessing reat-
tack criteria.
 Environmental Monitoring. The 
physical environment affects all aspects 
of military operations. It can be detri-
mental to our operations or used to our 
advantage. Our organic weather sensing 
capabilities are extremely limited in the 
data-sparse maritime domain; therefore, 
we rely almost exclusively on spacebased 
environmental monitoring  satellites to 
inform our planning.
 Space Domain Awareness (SDA). For 
the tactical fight, SDA provides an un-
derstanding of when friendly satellites 
are overhead to support operations 
and when adversary satellites are over-
head to detect our forces and cue their 
kill chains. Knowing these overflight 
schedules can contribute significantly 
to counter-ISR measures, planning op-
erational security (OPSEC), conduct-
ing tactical deception or deception in 
support of OPSEC, and knowing when 
we are able to employ offensive and de-
fensive space weapons and capabilities. 
Moreover, having adequate SDA, with 
respect to the sensor capabilities over-
head, can inform a wide range of actions 
that we can take to shape the adversary 
and give us the advantage.
Tactical Space Support and Space 
Control
 For the sake of keeping commonly 
used space terminology understood, we 
must break out the differences between 
space support and space control. Space 
control is defined as offensive and defen-
sive space capability employment. These 
are the platforms and tools that we use 
to target adversary space capabilities. 
These operations deny, degrade, disrupt, 
or destroy adversary space capabilities 
while protecting our own. Jamming an 
enemy SATCOM satellite is one ex-
ample of space control.
 Naturally, much of the authority to 
approve the employment of space con-
trol capabilities resides at the highest 
echelons of our government because of 
its strategic nature. This significantly 
hinders the training and operational 
employment of these systems, especially 
in operations where dynamic targeting 
of enemy capabilities is essential to mis-
sion success.
 For organic on-call space integra-
tion at the tactical level, that does not 
require approval from the Secretary of 
Defense, we have space support. Space 
support is simply pulling data from our 
space architecture, pushing it through 
our space support software tools, con-
ducting the analysis, and providing the 
products to our tactical units to sup-
port their planning efforts. These space 
support products provide new insights 
and planning considerations vital to fa-
cilitating independent and distributed 
tactical actions such as expeditionary 
advanced base operations. Integrating 
space support into planning at the low-
est tactical level is vital to ensuring that 
our tactical maneuver units inside the 
weapons engagement zone can oper-
ate independently without relying on 
operational-level space support entities 
far removed from the front lines.
 What Right Looks Like. To quickly 
develop a new capability, it helps to 
consider those already employing it. 
The Army has provided tactical space 
support to their forces for years through 
Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs). 
The ARSSTs provide basic space sup-
port products that enhance tactical and 
operational planning such as adversary 
overhead collection windows, GPS 
jammer modeling, GPS accuracy pre-
dictions, OPIR monitoring, electronic 
intelligence monitoring, and space 
weather effects. For space support that 
1stLt Adam Fountain sets up a SATCOM antenna to communicate with his sniper teams at ITX. 
(Photo by author.)
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falls beyond their organic capabilities, 
the ARSSTs simply submit a space sup-
port request through the joint force com-
mander’s Director of Space Forces to the 
Combined Space Operations Center for 
the needed products or effects. These 
functions are at the core of how tactical 
space support is provided to the force.
 Building the Space Support Capa-
bility Within the Marine Corps. Until 
the Marine Corps implements its own 
space training pipeline, we can gain 
the functional expertise by attending 
just two schools. The school that trains 
Army space professionals to create 
space support planning products is the 
three-week Tactical Space Operators 
Course (TSOC). This course requires 
students to have a foundational un-
derstanding of military space applica-
tions before attending. To meet this 
prerequisite, TSOC accepts graduation 
certificates from numerous courses that 
teach the foundations of space, such 
as the two-week Army Space Cadre 
Basic Course. On the shortest possible 
timeline, this can potentially have Ma-
rines trained to provide most of the 
same space support capabilities as an 
ARSST with as little as five weeks of 
training. These courses have already 
graduated several Marines who are now 
capable of providing the same space 
support capability that the ARSSTs 
provide. This ARSST-like training 
is currently spread across the Marine 
Corps in small numbers, with II MEF 
Information Group taking the lead in 
standing up the first functional Marine 
Space Support Team (MSST).
 The Marine Space Support Team. The 
II MIG MSST successfully integrates 
space planning at the tactical level to 
support OPSEC and deception plan-
ning and to inform signature manage-
ment and EMCON procedures. When 
II MEF units deploy to conduct train-
ing at home and abroad, the II MIG 
MSST supports these units with real-
world products that not only provide all 
of the information needed for planning 
but also make recommendations for 
detection mitigation techniques as well 
as shaping opportunities that can ma-
nipulate our adversary’s perception of 
the tactical situation. They also outline 
the most opportune times for maneuver 
and communications windows based 
on adversary ISR capabilities, giving 
our forces the ability to conceal and 
reveal when it is most advantageous. 
These same products also offer time-
lines for offensive opportunities, giving 
our units the exact time frames with 
respect to location (along with much 
more detailed information that can be 
used for targeting) to employ offensive 
and defensive space capabilities when 
adversary assets are vulnerable. 
 When necessary, the MSST is also 
able to coordinate space control in sup-
port of the MEF. As referenced earlier, 
space control is leveraging active mea-
sures for offensive and defensive space 
capability employment. Though the Ma-
rine Corps currently has not fully fielded 
organic space control assets, the MSST 
can coordinate the use of space-control 
assets owned by the other Services and 
entities within the DOD through space 
support request. As we begin to field fu-
ture space-control capabilities across the 
force, it will become necessary to create 
Marine Space Control Planning Teams 
(MSCPTs) to deconflict and coordinate 
these capabilities and integrate them into 
our fires planning.
 The MSST also monitors national 
OPIR and  ELINT feeds to provide 
near realtime targeting support and 
early warning. This task is essential in 
gaining and maintaining battlespace 
awareness and facilitating dynamic tar-
geting and maneuver.
 The challenge that the II MIG 
MSST is facing now is that supported 
units are beginning to understand the 
importance of integrating space consid-
erations into planning and the demand 
signal for space support is beginning 
to outpace our ability to align space-
trained Marines to fill these requests.
The Way Forward
 Organic space support at the tactical 
level within the Marine Corps is easily 
attainable and should become fully real-
ized through the MSSTs. To bring the 
Commandant’s guidance to fruition, 
changes need to be made in a few key 
areas, and although some of these issues 
are already being addressed at higher 
levels, we argue that it is essential to 
highlight all of the issues as we see them 
from the perspective of the warfighters 
engaged in this domain.
 The “Revolving Door” of Officers 
Trained in Operations in the Informa-
tion Environment (OIE). Currently, 
there is no primary MOS for space 
officers. The 0540 Space Operations 
Staff Officer is a Free MOS, but this 
non-primary MOS is not a feasible solu-
tion for the skills and expertise needed 
to do the job full-time in a way that 
truly enables the force. Officers from 
all primary MOSs arrive at the MIGs 
on two- to three-year orders, conduct 
the necessary training to do space sup-
port (which can take several weeks to 
several months depending on school 
Concept of Marine space integration at the operational level. (Photo by author.)
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timelines and limited seat availability), 
then after a relatively short time doing 
the job, the monitors cut them orders to 
a unit where they fall back in on roles 
and responsibilities mandated by their 
primary MOSs. Returning to the force 
in a non-space support capacity, their 
skills atrophy and the space training 
and experience gained, and the funding 
used to build the capability, is lost. The 
Commandant’s Planning Guidance  has 
directed that the Marine Corps must 
conduct OIE. The MIGs were created 
to conduct this specific mission, but 
we do not yet have the primary MOS 
needed to retain subject matter expertise 
and fulfill our Commandant’s task and 
purpose. As long as we are attempting 
to do OIE with free MOSs, we will 
continue to flounder in the place we are 
now, not having adequate experience 
and subject matter expertise to align 
well-trained Marines to our seventh 
warfighting function. We must change 
this if we expect to sustain meaning-
ful OIE within the Marine Corps. 
By building a primary career path for 
Marines tasked with the OIE mission, 
these Marines can begin to intelligently 
develop a way forward for Marine Corps 
multi-domain operations.
 Enlisted Space Marines. There are cur-
rently no enlisted space MOSs. This is a 
significant shortfall considering that if 
we plan to have organic space support 
capabilities, we will do so with no space 
support personnel allocated for the mis-
sion. The ARSSTs consist of two space 
officers (a major and a captain) and four 
enlisted soldiers specialized in intelli-
gence, SATCOM, signals intelligence, 
and geospatial intelligence, respectively. 
Though the II MIG MSST is currently 
providing space support equivalent to 
a fully manned ARSST, it is doing so 
with only a handful of TSOC-trained 
Marines.
 MIG Table of Organization and 
Equipment (TO&E). The MIG TO&E 
does not currently support aligning 
Marines to MSST functions as there 
are no space billet identification codes 
on the TO&E beyond two 0540s. To 
properly man a MSST, we would have 
to pull Marines from other duties allo-
cated within the TO&E and align them 
to duties that do not currently exist. If 
the Marine Corps plans to have space 
support capability, a TO&E Change 
Request must be submitted to create 
MSSTs and MSCPTs at the MIGs. The 
initial manning requirements should 
consist of four MSSTs and two MSCPTs 
per MIG. This allows the flexibility to 
maintain a standing team at the MIG 
for reachback support and CONUS 
operations as well as the capability to 
deploy teams to theater in support of 
MEF units abroad. These teams can 
plug into the information operations 
cells at the MEU, maneuver unit’s fire 
coordination nodes, and the maritime 
operations centers (MOCs) to coordi-
nate the employment of space-control 
capabilities at the theater level. The ca-
pability to forward deploy MSSTs and 
MSCPTs is essential when operating in 
a denied, degraded, and disrupted space 
operations environment, as the ability 
to “reachback” is held at significant risk 
in modern conflict.
 Competing Now and In the Future.
Until the Marine Corps fully realizes 
and fields its new space-control pro-
grams of record, we must focus on what 
we can do now to support our tactical 
units. With a couple of organizational 
changes and a small amount of hard-
ware and software, we can begin provid-
ing space support capability across the 
entire Marine Corps through MSSTs 
who are organized and deployed from 
the MIGs. This will facilitate the full 
integration of space planning down to 
the lowest tactical levels. At the opera-
tional level, the MSCPTs will coordi-
nate the space control aspects of the 
multi-domain approach to fires. As our 
new space programs of records  come 
online and employment concepts are 
confirmed and implemented, we will 
see these organic capabilities become 
fully integrated and responsive within 
our fire support plans.
How the Navy is Addressing the Prob-
lem
 As a critical component in integrat-
ing Navy and Marine space capabilities, 
it is helpful to look at how the Navy 
faces these same challenges. With 
the re-commissioning of U.S. Space 
Command came the re-commission-
ing of Naval Space Command, now 
the “third hat” of the Commander, 
Tenth Fleet, who also serves as Com-
mander, Fleet Cyber Command. Un-
der his guidance and direction, both 
cyber and space’s instrumental roles 
in fleet operations are beginning to be 
recognized. Navy Warfare Develop-
ment Command has concurrently taken 
steps toward evolving the integration 
of space capabilities in fleet operations 
beginning with the Fleet Experiment 
Marines under the Milky Way Galaxy during Exercise TALISMAN SABER 2017. (Photo by LCpl Breanna 
Weisenberger.)
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2017 Exercise. This effort has grown 
substantially with increasing inclusion 
of space elements into fleet battle prob-
lems and naval representation at joint 
globally integrated exercises. Through 
exercises like these, the recognition of 
the need for a broader understanding of 
the space domain as an integral part of 
the battlespace has become commonly 
shared with the Marine Corps, which 
is now refocusing its force design to-
ward amphibious operations and the 
full integration of the Navy-Marine 
Corps team. To take full advantage 
of the opportunities and to confront 
the challenges of today’s multi-domain 
combat environment, the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps will both need to continue 
to develop and integrate the necessary 
skills and capabilities for fighting from 
the space domain. Highlighted here are 
some ways that the Navy is approach-
ing these common challenges—with 
them come opportunities for the Navy-
Marine Corps team to evolve together to 
improve space integration in all aspects 
of warfare from the sea. 
 Formalizing a Path for a Space Cadre:- 
Addressing the “Revolving Door.” Like the 
Marine Corps, the Navy has not had 
the structure to retain its subject mat-
ter expertise in space operations. The 
Navy’s approach to developing space 
professionals has been its Space Cadre 
force structure. The Space Cadre—offi-
cers holding the additional qualification 
designators VS5-VS8—do not belong 
to a single designator or community 
but are made up of professional career 
officers from numerous communities 
who have cultivated some familiarity 
and proficiency with space capabilities. 
From this massing of diverse experi-
ences, they gain the benefit of the cre-
ative sourcing of ideas. However, the 
principal disadvantage is that most of 
these officers, once qualified, will never 
work in a space-related billet again. For 
almost every one of these communi-
ties, a specifically space-focused tour is 
viewed as a dissociated tour or a tour 
outside of what they should be doing to 
stay on track for promotion within their 
communities. One tour is an advantage; 
two or more is anathema. This situa-
tion is a direct parallel to the situation 
facing the Marine Corps. To address 
this challenge, in the May issue of Pro-
ceedings, VADM Brown discussed the 
development of a new Navy Maritime 
Space Officer designator—providing 
a permanent career path for officers to 
develop the level of operational space 
expertise needed now and in the future. 
The Marine Corps will likewise need to 
develop a Service-appropriate solution 
for the challenges they face in retaining 
space experience and expertise. 
 Space Integration at the Operational 
Level. Evolutionary stasis has been a bar-
rier to effective changes in the integra-
tion of space capabilities in naval and 
naval-supported operations in theater. 
Initial efforts at integration were oriented 
around an officer assigned to space op-
erations only as a collateral duty and 
frequently without formal training or 
prior experience. This is changing. The 
expansion of space training for deploying 
units and the integration of primary-duty 
space officers at the MOC, and into the 
organization of the Information Warfare 
Commander, is the beginning of a posi-
tive change in expanding space-enabled 
lethality from the sea. This brings us one 
step forward in addressing the difficult 
challenge of tactical situation manage-
ment. Further, by establishing space inte-
gration capabilities at the MOCs, there is 
a real opportunity to create a focal point 
capable of facilitating the requirements 
and reachback for all afloat operational 
units in theater. Everything from de-
confliction of satellite broadcast require-
ments to prioritizing imagery collection 
requirements supporting independent 
ballistic missile defense deployers can 
be facilitated through a common flow-
point. 
Navy and Marine Space Integration 
at Echelon
 The fight in the space domain is pri-
marily going to be at the combatant 
command theater-strategic level of war. 
The timing and tempo of operations in-
volving military space capabilities along 
with the many compartmented capa-
bilities, which need to be coordinated 
and sequenced at this higher level of 
war, represent as much as 80 percent of 
the space fight. Planning and develop-
ment of the processes and procedures for 
that segment are well understood and 
mature. What is less developed is the 
twenty percent of the fight that exists 
below the theater-strategic level. The 
Marine Corps is principally a force for 
the theater-operational to high-to-low 
tactical levels of war and will be a cru-
cial facet of the twenty percent fight. 
Developing Marines with the skills to 
provide tactical-level support and grow 
them to integrate Marine space require-
ments at the MOC needs to be the key 
focus of any developing organic space 
capability in the Marine Corps.
 The evolutionary development of 
organic Marine Corps space forces Heat map depicting GPS jamming effects in the battlespace. (Photo by author.)
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will be best served if that development 
is focused on growing the capability 
through the assignment of space-skilled 
Marines to tours requiring increasing 
technical proficiency. A starting point 
for space-skilled Marines is the MSST 
providing support at the tactical level 
of war. While the tactical level is where 
space capabilities will be brought di-
rectly to the fight, it is not the only place 
where Marines need to have a voice in 
space operations. We propose a struc-
ture for developing space proficiency 
from the tactical level to the operational 
level where the Marine Corps can in-
tegrate its need for space capabilities as 
part of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
 Marine Space Support Within the Am-
phibious Ready Group (ARG). Space-
skilled Marines assigned to the MEU/
MEB will simultaneously provide real-
time space support to the vanguard of 
Marine Corps expeditionary operations 
and develop the necessary skills to as-
sess the space control needs of Marine 
forces as part of more extensive opera-
tions. Those skills—reflecting opera-
tional experience to determine needs 
of the force—are fundamental to in-
tegrating Marine space capabilities at 
the operational level. Organic Marine 
Space Officers/Elements at the MEU/
MEB could integrate into a common 
Navy-Marine Corps Space Operation 
Element for ARG/MEU or Expedi-
tionary Strike Group deployment to 
consolidate unit-level requests, reduce 
duplication of effort, and further re-
fine a common understanding of the 
amphibious operational environment.
 Navy/Marine Corps Integration at 
the Operational Level. The integration 
of space capabilities at the MOC in 
support of maritime forces has been 
in development since 2015, with new 
doctrine being published as recently as 
late 2020 in the form of Navy Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures  3-14.1, Navy 
Space Tactics. However, no authorita-
tive/directive publication defining 
what the uniform space organization 
of a MOC looks like or how it is to 
be implemented has yet been released. 
This need is evidenced by the conspicu-
ous absence of organization standards 
for the required manning and train-
ing to support the MOC Space Cell 
in the Navy’s 2018 Maritime Opera-
tion Center Standardization Manual, 
despite space being identified as one 
of the key emerging Navy capability 
initiatives. The nascent organizational 
structure integrating maritime space re-
quirements is maturing, but the absence 
of guidance is delaying what could be 
a dynamic force-multiplying evolution 
of capability. 
 Now is the time for continuous and 
dynamic experimentation in finding 
what works best for standardizing the 
organization. These experiments should 
explore and evaluate multiple constructs 
to rapidly mature the doctrine, organi-
zation, training, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities of space op-
erations. A space operations cell at the 
MOC is a natural place for theater/
operational-level integration between 
Navy and Marine Corps space plan-
ners. It could serve as an instrumental 
interface point to prevent unnecessary 
duplication of effort, confusion, and 
conflict between competing require-
ments. One of the most significant 
things that the Marine Corps can do, 
in addition to fielding organic MSST 
capability at the tactical level, is to field 
and integrate an MSCPT at the MOC.
Conclusion
 We cannot let bureaucratic hurdles 
delay developing, resourcing, imple-
menting, and integrating the capabili-
ties necessary to establish resilience and 
maintain superiority in the space do-
main. We must let the end state—what 
success looks like—quickly drive the 
changes that we need to make, regard-
less of administrative challenges or dif-
ficulty. What is needed is an adaptive 
solution that can be implemented now 
and retains the ability to evolve in the 
future. What has always distinguished 
our Naval Services has been our adapt-
ability and boldness in pressing forward 
in new directions, with new capabilities, 
and our ability to evolve faster and with 
more agility than our adversaries. We 
must look to those traditions, now more 
than any time in the past 30 years, and 
once again dynamically adapt our force 
to rise to these new challenges. This is 
how we will win a future war from the 
sea—by employing all of our combat 
capabilities and maritime operational 
art through every domain and by fight-
ing first from the ultimate high ground.
>Authors’ Note: This article is the culmina-
tion of this year’s Marine Corps University 
Brute Krulak Center Barrow Fellowship, and 
its authors are Barrow Fellows.
 
“Investments will pri-
oritize ground, air, sea, 
and space forces that 
can deploy, survive, op-
erate, maneuver, and 
regenerate in all do-
mains while under at-
tack. Transitioning from 
large, centralized, un-
hardened infrastructure 
to smaller, dispersed, 
resilient, adaptive bas-
ing that include active 
and passive defenses 
will also be prioritized.”
—National Defense 
Strategy
What has always distinguished our Naval Services 
has been our adaptability and boldness in pressing 
forward in new directions, with new capabilities ...
